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Introduction
The breakup of AT&T created opportunities for the growth of local
telephone companies.' Many of these companies have sought to con-
struct new telephone lines to provide expanded service.2 Such construc-
tion may lead to a problem that California law does not currently
address.
This note discusses the conflict between the California Public Utili-
ties Code ("Public Utilities Code") and the portions of the California
Civil Code ("Civil Code") that address mechanics' liens and stop no-
tices.' A conflict exists in that public utilities, as defined by the Public
Utilities Code,4 seem to be exempt5 from mechanics' liens placed on their
property; yet according to the Civil Code, only "public entities" are ex-
empt from mechanics' liens.6 A recent California case held that public
utilities do not fall within the statutory definition of "public entities,"
implying that they are not exempt from mechanics' liens.7
The conflict between the two codes arises in situations such as where
the Public Utilities Commission ("PUC") approves a private company's
application to offer telephone service to the public.
1. See Ronald Rosenberg, Competitors Putting Heat on N.E Telephone, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 9, 1992, at 81. The article describes the growth of "alternative access providers" in the
Boston area. These companies are "local" in that they provide telephone service within lim-
ited geographic areas.
2. Id.
3. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3109-3214 (Deering 1986). Mechanics' liens are liens that are
placed on works of improvement by subcontractors to ensure that the subcontractors are paid
for the labor or material they provided. The liens are a creature of statute, ensuring that the
subcontractors have a remedy against the owners of the works of improvement. At common
law, the subcontractors, lacking privity of contract with the owner, would not have a remedy.
Stop notices are similar to liens in that they attach to property of the owner, but not to
real property. If a stop notice is properly filed, it acts to place a lien of sorts on the construc-
tion fund (the amount of the undisbursed monies the owner owes the original contractor). A
stop notice obligates the owner to make no further disbursements from the construction fund
until the claim of the stop notice claimant is satisfied or the fund is exhausted.
4. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216(a) (Deering 1990 & Supp. 1991).
5. Id. § 851 (Deering 1990).
6. California Civil Code section 3109 states that mechanics' liens do not apply to any
"public work." Section 3100 defines "public work" as "any work of improvement contracted
for by a public entity." Section 3099 defines "public entity" as "the state, Regents of the
University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other
political subdivision or public corporation in the state." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3099 (Deering
1990). Public utilities are conspicuously absent.
7. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Ct. App.
1989). See discussion infra at notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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The company is thereafter considered a public utility.8 This newly
created utility may decide to construct underground conduits to house its
phone lines. To this end, the company hires a general contractor to build
the conduits. If, during the course of construction, the general contrac-
tor runs out of funds and cannot meet its obligations to subcontractors, 9
the subcontractors may attempt to place mechanics' liens on the
conduit. 10
There are indications that a public utility is exempt from mechanics'
liens, but the law is not well established." Section 851 of the Public
Utilities Code states that no one may encumber the property of a public
utility that is necessary and useful for service to the public without the
approval of the PUC. 2 The PUC and California courts of appeal have
8. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3. An entity may also be considered a utility if it operates
telephone lines for the use or accommodation of a definite portion of the public. See CAL.
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216.
9. For the purposes of this note, "subcontractors" will be used to refer to all people
entitled to mechanics' liens, as defined in California Civil Code section 3110.
10. The conduit, is known as a "work of improvement." California law defines "work of
improvement" as,
the construction, alteration, addition to, or repair, in whole or in part, of any build-
ing, wharf, bridge, ditch, flume, aqueduct, well, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, or
road, the seeding, sodding, or planting of any lot or tract of land for landscaping
purposes, the filling, leveling, or grading of any lot or tract of land, the demolition of
buildings, and the removal of buildings.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3106 (Deering 1990).
11. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
12. California Public Utilities Code section 851 states:
No public utility other than a common carrier by railroad subject to Part I of the
Interstate Commerce Act (Title 49, USC) shall sell, lease, assign, mortgage, or other-
wise dispose of or encumber the whole or any part of its railroad, street railroad, line,
plant, system, or other property necessary or useful in the performance of its duties
to the public, or any franchise or permit or any right thereunder, nor by any means
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, merge or consolidate its railroad, street railroad,
line, plant, system, or any other property or franchises or permits or any part thereof,
with any other public utility, without having first secured from the commission an
order authorizing it to do so. Every such sale, lease, assignment, mortgage, disposi-
tion, encumbrance, merger, or consolidation made other than in accordance with the
order of the commission authorizing it is void. The permission and approval of the
commission to the exercise of a franchise or permit under Article 1 (commencing
with § 1001) of Chapter 5 of this part, or the sale, lease, assignment, mortgage or
other disposition or encumbrance of a franchise or permit under this article shall not
revive or validate any lapsed or invalid franchise or permit, or enlarge or add to the
powers or privileges contained in the grant of any franchise or permit, or waive any
forfeiture.
Nothing in this section shall prevent the sale, lease, encumbrance or other dispo-
sition by any public utility of property which is not necessary or useful in the per-
formance of its duties to the public, and any disposition of property by a public
utility shall be conclusively presumed to be of property which is not useful or neces-
sary in the performance of its duties to the public, as to any purchaser, lessee or
encumbrancer dealing with such property in good faith for value; provided, however,
1992]
interpreted section 851 to mean that the PUC has the power to invalidate
any liens placed on public utility property without PUC approval. 13 Yet
there is no express procedure within the PUC for applying for such
approval.
The relevant statutes within the Civil Code governing mechanics'
liens do not mention utilities.' 4 They say only that mechanics' liens may
not be placed on the works of "public entities,"' 5 and as noted above, a
recent decision has held that utilities are not "public entities.' 16
Under the Civil Code, the liens are presumed valid if properly
filed.' 7 Under the Public Utilities Code, the liens are presumed invalid.'"
There lies the conflict.
Subcontractors will maintain that the Civil Code should prevail.
They will argue that a court should allow their liens on utility property,
because mechanics' lien law is to be interpreted broadly to ensure that
they have a remedy19 and to ensure that the owner of the work of im-
provement is not unjustly enriched.20
The owner (the public utility) will maintain that the Public Utilities
Code should prevail. The utility will urge a court to declare any lien
invalid because public policy disallows the property of a utility used to
serve the public to be encumbered by a lien and therefore subject to fore-
closure and sale. The utility will also argue that section 851 specifically
addresses the issue, while the mechanics' lien statutes are silent.
As applied to telephone conduits, the utility can make numerous
other arguments turning on how the conduit is characterized: whether it
is a fixture, whether it is personal property, and whether the conduit lies
on an implied easement through the land. These distinctions may be im-
portant, because the manner in which the conduit is characterized deter-
mines to what the lien attaches.
that nothing in this section shall apply to the interchange of equipment in the regular
course of transportation between connecting common carriers.
(Deering 1990).
13. In re Golconda Utils. Co., 65 P.U.C. 174, 175-76 (1965); Hosford v. Henry, 238 P.2d
91, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3109-3154 (Deering 1990 & Supp. 1991).
15. Id § 3099 (Deering 1986).
16. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Ct. App.
1989).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3109-3154 (Deering 1986).
18. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851, which declares that any encumbrance is invalid if it
is not first approved by the PUC.
19. Corbett v. Chambers, 41 P. 873, 875 (Cal. 1895).
20. See John R. Gentle & Co. v. Britton, 111 P. 9 (Cal. 1910) (interprets mechanics' liens
as providing a method by which the owner is estopped from enjoying the subcontractor's ef-
forts without compensating the subcontractor).
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Stop notices, another device by which subcontractors can secure
payment, seem to provide an alternative remedy. Stop notices, however,
were created to provide a remedy for subcontractors working for "public
entities. ' 21  Thus, when working for a utility (which is not a "public
entity" 22), subcontractors would seem justified in relying on mechanics'
liens to provide relief from a defaulting contractor. Yet if mechanics'
liens cannot attach to the property of a utility, the only remedy for sub-
contractors is the stop notice.
This creates two problems. First, subcontractors are not on notice
that their only remedy is the stop notice because the issue of mechanics'
liens on the property of a utility has never been fully addressed. Una-
ware that their only remedy is a stop notice, subcontractors may opt only
to file mechanics' liens. Second, under the Civil Code, a subcontractor's
only remedy is a stop notice when the owner is a public entity, and the
public entity is required by law to post a payment bond.23 Because utili-
ties are not "public entities,"' 24 they need not post such a bond, so it is
conceivable that subcontractors are protected by neither mechanics' liens
nor stop notices. The mechanics' liens are no protection if the PUC de-
clares them void, and the stop notices are no protection if the construc-
tion fund is exhausted without a payment bond to ensure payment.
25
This note will discuss the situations in which the need for mechan-
ics' liens and stop notices arises and the procedures for obtaining them.
The note will then discuss the Public Utilities Code. The conflict be-
tween the two areas of law will be analyzed, and a solution offered.
I
Background
A. Mechanics' Liens and Stop Notices
When someone (usually the owner of the underlying property) hires
a contractor to undertake a work of improvement, the contractor will
hire subcontractors specializing in various trades to assist him. The con-
tractor is paid directly by the owner. The owner may pay in installments
21. Weldon v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 P. 502 (Cal. 1903).
22. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3247 (Deering 1984 & Supp. 1991). The California Civil Code
requires every contractor who is awarded a public works contract exceeding $25,000 to post a
payment bond. Id.
24. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
25. A stop notice acts as a lien against the res, the construction fund. The stop notice acts
only against the fund, and any payments to the subcontractors are limited by the amount
remaining in the fund when the owner receives the first stop notice. If the amount of claims
exceeds the amount of the fund, the fund is interpleaded and divided among the claimants. See
infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
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corresponding to the progress on the work of improvement. The subcon-
tractors are not in contract with the owner and look to the contractor for
payment. If the contractor does not pay the subcontractors, under com-
mon law rules of contract, the subcontractors are not able to look to the
owner (the beneficiary of their efforts) for compensation because they
lack privity of contract. The mechanics' lien statutes were promulgated
to remedy this problem.26
Whenever a subcontractor provides labor or material for a work of
improvement, the subcontractor must send to the owner a Preliminary
Notice in order to preserve its lien rights.27 The Preliminary Notice
alerts the owner to the fact that the contractor has hired a subcontractor
and tells the owner how much the subcontractor expects to be paid for its
efforts.28 If the subcontractor is not paid within ninety days of the com-
pletion of the work of improvement (thirty days if the owner has posted a
Notice of Completion), the subcontractor may file a lien on the improved
property with the County Recorder.29
A mechanics' lien works as any other lien; it attaches to and encum-
bers title to the property.30 If, ninety days after filing the lien, the subcon-
tractor has not been paid, the subcontractor may file suit to foreclose the
lien, and be paid what he is owed from the proceeds of a foreclosure
sale.3 '
Mechanics' liens are authorized in the state constitution.32 They are
an equitable remedy33 designed to ensure that the providers of labor and
material are compensated for their efforts.34 As such, the mechanics' lien
statutes in the Civil Code are to be liberally construed. 35 This is impor-
tant, because it adds credence to the argument favoring enforcement of
the liens when enforcement would conflict with the Public Utilities Code.
If the subcontractor chooses not to file a mechanics' lien, it has an
additional remedy in the stop notice. 36 Stop notices are statutory alter-
natives to mechanics' liens. They were created for situations where the
owner is a "public entity.",37 Foreclosing on property owned by a public
26. Nolte v. Smith, 11 Cal. Rptr. 261 (Ct. App. 1961).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3114, 3160 (Deering 1986).
28. Id. § 3097 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1991).
29. Id. § 3116 (Deering 1986).
30. Ritter v. Stevenson, 7 Cal. 388, 389 (1857).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3144 (Deering 1986).
32. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
33. John R. Gentle & Co. v. Britton, 11I P. 9, 10 (Cal. 1910).
34. Borchers Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co., 379 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal. 1963).
35. Baker v. Hubbard, 161 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555 (Ct. App. 1980); Continental v. Hutton, 78
P. 21, 21 (Cal. 1904).
36. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3156-3175 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1991).
37. Bates v. County of Santa Barbara, 27 P. 438, 439 (Cal. 1891).
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entity does not serve the best interests of the public, so when the owner is
a public entity, stop notices are the sole remedy."8 Stop notices, however,
are not limited to situations where the owner is a public entity. They
may be used in addition to, and cumulative with, mechanics' liens if the
owner is a private entity.39
Stop notices are considered equitable garnishments." They do not
attach to land or property, but to the construction fund the owner owes
to the contractor.41 An owner who receives a stop notice (which also
must be recorded with the County Recorder) is not obligated to make
further payments to the contractor.42 The money that the owner would
normally be paying the contractor under the terms of the contract re-
mains with the owner, as the construction fund. Between ten and ninety
days after the work of improvement is completed, the subcontractors
who have not been paid and who have filed valid stop notices may sue to
enforce their notices.43 At that time, the owner may deposit the con-
struction fund with the court, and the court will disburse it among the
subcontractors in an interpleader action." If the amount of the fund is
insufficient to satisfy all the claims, the fund will be apportioned, with
each subcontractor receiving a pro rata share.4"
B. The Public Utilities Code
To become a public utility, an entity need only file a petition with
the PUC." In the case of telephone companies, this petition would be a
38. See supra text accompanying note 6.
39. Calhoun v. Huntington Park First Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. Rptr. 479, 484 (Ct. App.
1960).
40. Id.
41. Harsco Corp. v. Department of Pub. Works, 98 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (Ct. App. 1971).
42. The owner has a duty to make no further payments unless the owner posts a payment
bond pursuant to California Civil Code section 3235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3161 (Deering 1986
& Supp. 1992).
43. Id. § 3172 (Deering 1986).
44. Id. § 3175 (Deering 1986).
45. Id § 3167 (Deering 1986).
46. California Public Utilities Code section 1001 (Deering 1990) states that in order for an
entity to commence any construction of facilities to serve the public it must first obtain a
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the PUC. Once an entity has been granted such
a certificate, the PUC recognizes it as a utility.
An entity may be considered to be a utility without applying for such a certificate, how-
ever. The California Constitution sets broad guidelines, declaring all entities which own, oper-
ate, control or manage a line, plant, or system for the transportation of people and property,
the transmission of telephone messages, or the production, generation, transmission, or fur-
nishing of heat, light, or water are public utilities subject to control of the PUC. CAL. CONS'r.
art. XII, § 3.
For cases interpreting these guidelines, see Allen v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 175 P. 466
(Cal. 1918); Greyhound Lines v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 438 P. 2d 801 (Cal. 1968).
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request for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to provide
telephone service to the general public.47 The petition must contain such
information as the projected service area and client base, the nature of
the telephone services to be offered, the financial stability of the proposed
utility, and the means by which the utility's customers would be served
(e.g., using existing lines or building new ones).4" If the PUC grants the
utility's petition, it issues an Order allowing the utility to proceed and a
Certificate declaring the entity a public utility.
The PUC oversees and regulates utilities in accordance with the
Public Utilities Code.49 The Public Utilities Code places strict restric-
tions on utilities and allows the PUC to regulate nearly every aspect of a
utility's operations that affect the public. Some examples of the PUC's
authority include the regulation of rates, 50 the construction of new facili-
ties,5" and the transfer of property. 52 Although it is a relatively simple
procedure to be declared a public utility, utilities' activities must be
strictly regulated because utilities are unique entities providing essential
services to the public.5" The demand for these services is generally in-
elastic, so there is potential for abuse and exploitation if the utilities are
not strictly regulated. 54
The crux of this note involves section 851 of the Public Utilities
Code, which declares that no utility may encumber any of its property
that is "necessary and useful" in its service to the public without the
prior approval of the PUC.55 There are two California cases which indi-
cate that this prohibition on encumbrances applies to liens.
In Hosford v. Henry,56 the defendant Henry operated a water and
power company licensed by the PUC. He borrowed money from Hos-
ford, securing his debt with a deed and a note. Prior to borrowing the
money, Henry applied to the PUC for permission to encumber the por-
tion of property secured by the note. He obtained PUC approval, but in
the PUC application, only two small parcels of land were mentioned as
security. Hosford claimed that pursuant to an earlier understanding, the
entirety of Henry's utility property was secured by the deed. He asked
the trial court to reform the contract, grant a lien over all the utility
47. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1001 (Deering 1986).
48. See id. §§ 1001-1011 (Deering 1986).
49. Id. § 701 (Deering 1986).
50. Id. §§ 726-745 (Deering 1986).
51. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 761-786 (Deering 1986).
52. See id. §§ 851-56 (Deering 1986).
53. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 401 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1965).
54. Id.
55. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 853 (Deering 1980).
56. 238 P.2d 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
HASTNGS COMM/ENT L.J. (Vol. 14:621
MECHANIcS' LIENS AND SToP NoTicEs CONFLICT
property, and foreclose on the lien. The trial court did so. The appellate
court reversed, saying that PUC approval was absolutely necessary for
the placement of a lien, regardless of how the trial court reformed the
contract.57 The appellate court upheld the authority of the PUC, saying
that a court in equity had no power to impose a lien that had not been
previously approved by the PUC.58
In In re Golconda Utilities Company,59 the PUC declared a sheriff's
foreclosure sale on utility property void because it was undertaken with-
out PUC approval. The sheriff's sale was the result of the foreclosure of
a mechanics' lien. The PUC said that the sale was directly contrary to
section 851 of the Public Utilities Code and therefore invalid. The PUC
did suggest, however, that authorization for the transfer "might possibly
have been obtained by the transferee upon a showing that the transfer
would not impair ... service to the public," but the PUC failed to deline-
ate the procedure by which the transferee might make such a showing."
II
Analysis
The section above demonstrates the conflict between the mechanics'
lien statutes and the Public Utilities Code. The conflict can easily arise
when a telephone company, seeking to construct new lines, hires a con-
tractor who defaults on payments to the subcontractors. Under the
mechanics' lien law, subcontractors have the option of filing a mechanics'
lien, a stop notice, or both.61 If they elect to file a mechanics' lien, they
may not be able to foreclose on the lien because of the language of section
851 of the Public Utilities Code.
There is nothing in the Public Utilities Code addressing mechanics'
liens other than section 851, and public utilities are never specifically
mentioned in the mechanics' lien statutes, so one must turn to the case
law for a resolution. Unfortunately, there is no case law on point, per-
haps because the deregulation of the telephone industry is a fairly recent
occurrence.62 Thus, the only way to find a solution to the conflict is to
attempt to analogize the situation to existing law.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 98. The Hosford court interpreted sections 51 and 52 of the Public Utilities
Code, which have since been repealed. However, section 851 of the Code incorporates the
relevant language of these sections almost verbatim.
59. 65 P.U.C. 174 (1965).
60. Id. at 176.
61. Bates v. County of Santa Barbara, 27 P. 438 (Cal. 1891).
62. See Rosenberg, supra note 1.
1992]
There are several ways to approach and analyze the situation. One
may try to discern if it is even proper for a lien to attach to anything.
Under mechanics' lien law, the lien normally attaches not only to the
work of improvement itself but also to the property on which it sits.
63
This is so because the owner of the land will most likely benefit from any
improvement to the property, and a lien preserves the rights of the sub-
contractors if the work of improvement is torn down or destroyed. In
the case of telephone lines, however, the owner of the underlying prop-
erty is usually the city or county in which the utility operates. Telephone
conduits that carry lines are usually constructed beneath streets or on
poles along sidewalks.
To construct a telephone conduit beneath a city's streets, a utility
need only apply to the city for a permit.6" Initially, the permit gives the
utility a license to lay and maintain the conduit on the public land.65
Over time, the license may expressly or impliedly become an easement.66
Thus the work of improvement (the conduit) remains distinct from the
real property on which it sits.
The California Supreme Court has held that a lien may exist on the
work of improvement alone and need not attach to the underlying prop-
erty. In English v. Olympic Auditorium,67 the court said that the word
"property" as used in the constitutional provision providing for mechan-
ics' liens68 "obviously refers to the building or other structure for which
the materials have been furnished or labor bestowed ...- 6 The court
also stated that "a lien may exist on a structure independently of the land
upon which it is erected .... ""
Although this case arose in a situation where the work of improve-
ment was on rented land, a court could easily infer that such a holding
applies when the work of improvement lies on a license or easement. A
court choosing to make such an inference would hold that a lien attaches
to the conduits without regard to the public streets under which they lie.
A second important issue regarding the conduits is whether a court
would consider them real property or personal property. Two cases in-
63. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15 (repealed 1972); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3110 and 3128
(Deering 1986).
64. Pettis v. General Tel. Co. of Cal., 54 Cal. Rptr. 476, 478 (Ct. App. 1966) superseded
by 426 P.2d 884 (Cal. 1967).
65. Id. at 479.
66. Id.
67. 20 P.2d 946 (Cal. 1933).
68. The court interprets article XX, section 15 of the California Constitution. Section 15
was repealed in 1976, but article XIV, section 3 (adopted 1976), is identical but for the substi-
tution of "persons furnishing materials" for "materialmen."
69. English, 20 P.2d at 951.
70. Id.
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volving water pipelines address this issue,7" and they conflict. If the con-
duits are classified as real property, then there is no problem with a lien
attaching to them. But if the conduits are classified as personal property,
then they may or may not be subject to a lien. A recent case has held
that personal property is subject to a mechanics' lien only if it has meta-
morphosed into a fixture.72
Whether or not something is a fixture is a question of fact,7 3 and a
wide variety of items have been held to be fixtures.74 The Civil Code
offers little guidance, merely stating that an object is a fixture if it is at-
tached to or imbedded in the land.7" The case law directs the courts to
look to the permanency of the object as well as to the intent of the par-
ties.76 Because of the permanent nature of a telephone conduit, it seems
likely that a jury would find a conduit to be a fixture, and therefore sub-
ject to a mechanics' lien. This raises another problem. Section 1013 of
the Civil Code states that when a person affixes property to the land
without an agreement to remove it, the thing affixed becomes the prop-
erty of the owner of the land. This seems to indicate that the conduit
belongs to the city (absent an agreement to remove it), but this is hardly
likely in light of the discussion of licenses and easements above.77
Even if telephone conduits can be characterized as property that is
subject to mechanics' liens, a problem arises from the language of section
851 of the Public Utilities Code. As noted earlier, section 851 states that
any encumbrance of utility property without the consent of the PUC is
void.78 A lien is an encumbrance, and the case law seems to indicate that
the PUC can declare such a lien void if obtained without its approval.79
Yet there may be some dispute as to whether "encumber" applies to the
subcontractors, or just to the utility. For example, section 851 states,
"No public utility ... shall ... encumber . . . ."8o This prohibits the
utility from actively encumbering property. Yet with the filing of a
mechanics' lien, it is the subcontractors who are encumbering the prop-
erty, not the utility. Of course, the property is still encumbered, but the
utility has not actually encumbered it directly through its own actions.
71. Robinson v. City of Glendale, 187 P. 741 (Cal. 1920); City of Vallejo v. Burrill, 221 P.
676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923).
72. Energrey Enters. v. Oak Creek Energy Sys., Inc., 119 B.R. 739, 742 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
73. Gosliner v. Briones, 204 P. 19, 20 (Cal. 1922).
74. See 44 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 38 (1978).
75. CAL. CIV. CODE § 660 (Deering 1986).
76. Collins Elec. v. Shasta County, 101 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Ct. App. 1972) (quoting County of
Ventura v. Channel Islands State Bank, 59 Cal. Rptr. 404, 409 (Ct. App. 1967)).
77. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 12 for the text of § 851.
79. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
80. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851 (Deering 1990).
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A likely explanation is that the authors of the Public Utilities Code did
not anticipate any encumbrances of utility property in which the utility
did not take an active role."'
The Public Utilities Code does not provide a procedure for third
parties to follow if they wish to obtain permission to encumber a utility's
property with a lien. This may be an oversight. On the other hand, it
may be that allowing liens on property used by a utility for public service
presents too many logistical problems, such as how a foreclosure sale
would operate and whether only utilities would be allowed to bid. To
allow property that had been used to serve the public to fall into private
hands seems contrary to public policy. Yet if liens cannot attach, then
the subcontractors who did not file stop notices are left without a rem-
edy, and the owner is perhaps unjustly enriched.
In a recent case, Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Southern California
Edison Co., 2 the plaintiff sought to have utilities declared "public enti-
ties" under the definition in the Civil Code.8" The plaintiff suggested that
because it is against public policy for liens to attach to utility property,
utilities should be declared public entities, forcing them to post a bond
for every construction project, and making stop notices the sole rem-
edy. 4 The court refused to classify the utility as a public entity, saying
that utilities are not public entities under the statutory definition. 5 The
court declined to comment on whether the mechanics' lien was enforcea-
ble against the utility, because the lien was not filed in the proper county
and was therefore invalid.8 6
The court erred. Following the flawed reasoning of the Hosford and
Golconda decisions, the court merely said that section 851 does not pre-
clude the recording and enforcement of mechanics' liens.8 7 The court
stated that section 851 permits a lien if "the Public Utilities Commission
first issues an authorizing order." "Thus," the court continued, "the sec-
tion does not 'preclude' a mechanics' lien." 8 Unfortunately, the court
81. The case law is silent on this particular point, but when looking at section 851, one
should note that all the verbs that follow the proscription, "No public utility... shall..." are
active verbs ("sell, lease, assign, mortgage, dispose..."). The utility, the subject of the sen-
tence, is the actor with regard to all the verbs, presumably including the verb "encumber." To
a utility, a mechanics' lien is a passive encumbrance, occurring as a consequence of actions by
a party other than the utility. Thus, it can be argued that mechanics' liens are not contem-
plated by section 851.
82. 266 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Ct. App. 1989).
83. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3099 (Deering 1990); see also supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
84. Automatic Sprinkler, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
85. Id.
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did not look beyond section 851 to recognize that in practice it does pre-
clude the recordation and enforcement of a mechanics' lien.
It precludes a mechanics' lien in two ways. First, as noted above,
there is no procedure by which a subcontractor can petition for PUC
authorization to record and enforce a lien. Second, a subcontractor is
not on notice that section 851 applies to mechanics' liens because section
851 is not mentioned anywhere in the mechanics' lien statutes. Even if a
subcontractor were deemed to have constructive notice of the applicabil-
ity of section 851 when working on a work of improvement owned by a
utility, there is no statutory method by which a subcontractor receives
notice that the owner is a utility. Without any requirement that the
owner/utility give notice that it is a utility and that section 851 applies,
there is no reason for a subcontractor to suspect that it is working for a
utility and therefore must petition the PUC to obtain a lien.
An examination of Civil Code section 309989 reveals an extensive
list of what is considered a "public entity." The Automatic Sprinkler
court scanned the list and did not find public utilities. The court could
have easily inferred that public utilities fell into this category, but it felt
bound by the exact language of the statute. Therefore, it is the legisla-
ture's duty to remedy the situation.
III
Proposal
There are several possible solutions to the problem. One option
would be to enact a statute allowing subcontractors to encumber the
property of a utility without obtaining the permission of the PUC. This
is not the best alternative, because a lien could lead to a foreclosure sale,
in which property used to serve the public is purchased by a private en-
tity. Such a private entity would not be approved by the PUC, nor
granted a permit by whichever governmental body owns the land on
which the property sits. This option has the undesirable potential to re-
move from the public domain property devoted to the public good.
Alternatively, the legislature could enact a statute making it clear
that mechanics' liens are invalid against utilities and that utilities are not
required to post payment bonds. This would provide the subcontractors
with notice that their only remedy is a stop notice, but would not protect
them from the early draining of a construction fund.
Another option would be for the PUC to enact a regulation under
which utilities would be required to disclose their status as utilities to all
subcontractors and provide notice of section 851. This could be done
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3099 (Deering 1990); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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easily, by requiring the utility to mail notice of its status to every entity
from which it receives a Preliminary Notice. 90 In conjunction with that
regulation, the PUC could enact a regulation outlining and streamlining
the process to apply to encumber the property of a utility. The problem
with this solution is that, eventually, liens would attach to the property
of utilities. This is contrary to the public interest. If liens can attach to
the property of a utility, eventually one of the liens may be foreclosed.
When that happens, the property may be sold at auction. This would
take property devoted to the public good out of the public domain, there-
fore harming the public in order to benefit one subcontractor.
A further option would be to do nothing. This is the approach fa-
vored by the legal department of Southern California Edison, the defend-
ant utility in Automatic Sprinkler. They find that it is to their benefit to
allow liens to be filed, because a large number of them are not properly
filed and therefore dismissed. 9 The liens that are properly filed (known
as "perfected") are paid off by the utility prior to any judicial action. 92
Southern California Edison believes that this procedure is better than
requiring utilities to post bonds as public entities, because such require-
ments may make some construction projects prohibitively expensive.93 A
problem with this approach is that if subcontractors are led to believe
that their liens can attach, a utility may one day decide not to pay the
liens and argue that the liens should not be allowed to attach under sec-
tion 851.
The final and soundest alternative would be to declare that public
utilities are to be considered "public entities" for the purposes of
mechanics' lien law and to require utilities to send to subcontractors no-
tice of their status as public entities.94 This solution would require gen-
eral contractors to post payment bonds whenever they undertake a work
of improvement for public utilities.95 The law of payment bonds9 6 was
enacted to afford a remedy to subcontractors who lose the remedy of
90. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.




94. Notice should be given in the manner suggested in the text accompanying note 84.
The notice requirement is a crucial aspect of this proposal. There is not a notice provision in
the payment bond statutes (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3247-3252 (Deering 1986)). A reason for this
may be that most public entities are readily identifiable as such by their name (eg., The City of
San Francisco, UC Hastings), therefore providing constructive notice of their status as public
entities. Telephone companies and other utilities often do not have names that denote their
status as utilities, so they should give notice.
95. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3109-3154 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1991).
96. Id. §§ 3247-3252.
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mechanics' liens when they work on a public work;97 The remedy of stop
notices would remain, but subcontractors would have an additional dis-
tinct remedy, an action on the payment bond.98
This alternative would clarify the existing law, provide notice of the
clarification, and remove utilities from the danger of having their prop-
erty encumbered and foreclosed upon. It would require general contrac-
tors to post a payment bond, which would escalate the cost of
construction. Nonetheless, the additional cost would be passed to the
utility, who would pass the cost to its customers. The customers would
therefore bear the ultimate cost of ensuring that construction undertaken
for their benefit is paid for.
IV
Conclusion
The problem this note has addressed is the uncertainty caused by
the conflict between the mechanics' lien statutes and the California Pub-
lic Utilities Code. This conflict can have disastrous consequences for
subcontractors, who may be left without a remedy to obtain payment for
goods or services they have provided.
There are potential remedies, but the best course of action would be
to amend section 3099 of the California Civil Code to include public util-
ities within the definition of "public entities." If utilities were declared
"public entities," then any work of improvement they undertook would
be considered a public work, and the general contractor would be re-
quired to post a payment bond. The contractor would presumably pass
this extra cost of construction to the utility, increasing the cost of con-
struction and possibly increasing rates. Yet these are increases the public
should bear. California subcontractors should contract freely, secure in
the knowledge that the California Civil Code is safeguarding their
interests.
97. California Elec. Supply Co. v. United Pac. Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 479, 482 (Ct.
App. 1964).
98. Globe Indem. Co. v. Hanify, 20 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1933).
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